The Zulu uprising in Natal during 1906 was the result of a series of
culminating factors and misfortunes; an economic slump following the end of the
Boer War, simmering discontent at the influx of White and Indian immigration
causing demographic changes in the landscape, a devastating outbreaks of
rinderpest among cattle and a rise in a quasi-religious separatist movement
with a rallying call of, ‘Africa for the Africans’.
The agricultural mainstay of the economy of Natal had been adversely
affected by the depletion of the Black workforce to the more lucrative work in
the mines of the Witwatersrand. The imposition of Hut Tax was a further burden
and then the introduction of a Poll Tax on each male over 18 years in Natal and
Zululand by the cash-strapped government was to be the final straw turning
discontent into open rebellion.
The enforced collection of this tax was deeply resented by many Blacks,
it raised tensions considerably within Natal and resulted in a series of
incidents and finally the murder of a farmer and the deaths of two Natal
policemen in January 1906. This caused the Governor Sir Henry McCullum to
declare Martial Law on the 9 February and the militia were called out.
Although the Zulu King Dinizulu (King Cetshwayo’s son and successor)
paid his taxes, he is believed to have given tacit approval to other dissenters
who refused to pay and this further fermented the revolt. The summary
executions of 12 tribesmen on the 2 April near Richmond, for complicity in the
murders of the policemen, fanned the flames into armed revolt.
A minor chief of the Mpanza, Bambata (1865-1906?) of the Greytown area,
was considered a ‘thoroughly bad character’ by the Colonial authorities, but he
held considerable influence over a large area and he was the first to take up
arms after he was deposed as chief for refusal to pay. He sought refuge in King
Dinizulu’s kraal and there left his wife and family under royal protection and
in doing so implicated the king in the rebellion. Bambata then fled to the
Nkandla forest, where he was joined by a large group of disaffected Zulus.
In April, a column of local units, Umvoti Mounted Rifles and Natal Field
Artillery, under Lt Colonel G Leuchar, proceeded to the Mpanza area and shelled
Bambata’s kraal causing him to flee to the mouth of the Mome Gorge. There they
were joined by Lt Colonel ‘Galloping Jack’ Royston and the 1st and 2nd
Royston’s Horse, which he had raised and which numbered 838 by the close of
operations.
Units involved
It had been decided by the Colonial government not to involve Imperial
troops in quelling this rebellion, relying instead on the Natal militia with military assistance from the Cape and Transvaal. The Transvaal sent 535 men of the Imperial Light Horse
(ILH), Johannesburg Mounted Rifles (JMR), South African Light Horse (SALH) and
the Northern, Eastern and Western Mounted Rifles, these were collectively
called the Transvaal Mounted Rifles under the command of Lt Colonel W F Barker.
The Cape also sent a 321 man detachment of
Mounted (CMR) and Border Rifles (BMR) under Lt Colonel J Dick. The Natal Naval
Corps was mobilised as was the Indian Stretcher Bearer unit in which M K Gandi
served.
The first skirmish in the Nkandla forest, extremely rugged terrain
covering an area of 20 km by 8 km, took place in May. The militia force was
divided into smaller columns under the commands of Colonel’s Barker, Royston,
MacKenzie and Mansel, It was here too that Bambata was joined by Sigananda, a
95 year old Zulu aristocrat of the amaCube tribe, a relative of King Shaka and
who was revered by his tribesmen. However, a pincer movement by the converging
columns succeeded in cutting off their line of retreat and crucially caused the
loss of large numbers of cattle and goats which robbed the rebels of their
wherewithal to continue the rebellion. Terms for surrender were offered by the
Zulus on the 24 May but this later proved to be a ploy for time.
A concerted ‘drive’ over the next 10 days by Colonel Duncan MacKenzie,
in overall command of the troops, through the forest and a sharp action at
Tathe Gorge, resulted in a concentration of Zulu forces at their stronghold at
Mome Gorge on the 2 June. After a series of smaller sharp encounters, the
decisive action was fought on the 10 June, when Bamata is believed to have been
killed and Sigananda was taken prisoner two days’ later and subsequently died
in prison on the 22 June 1906.
The Medal
In 1907 the Natal Government was authorised to issue a silver medal
for service between 8 Feb-3 Aug 1906.
Those who served for 50 days on active service were awarded the bar ‘1906’ and
10,000 medals were issued about 20% being without bar. The effigy of King
Edward faces to the right and the ribbon is crimson with black edges. Officer’s
medals were engraved and the remainder were impressed
Bambatha’s Personal Rebellion
In
1906 a portion of the Zondi people living in the Umvoti Division of Natal
rebelled
against
the colonial government. Led by their recently deposed chief BambathakaMancinza, the rebels in rapid succession seized his successor (2 April), attacked the
resident magistrate (3 April) and ambushed the Natal Police (4 April) before transferring
their operations to Zululand (7 April). Thus began what is known as the ‘Bambatha
Rebellion’ or the ‘Zulu Rebellion’, with several less well-known names as well, which
disturbed the Colony of Natal during the autumn and winter of 1906. It is generally accepted that the rebellion was triggered off by the collection of a poll tax, although there were underlying factors which conditioned the disturbances. The rebellion marks a watershed in the history of the region, in that African people, hitherto submissive to colonial rule, for the first time expressed a general grievance by resorting to violence on a large scale. It is not always clear whether the rebels, in challenging the Supreme Chief of the colony, sought a revolution in government or a redress of grievances, and this lack of clarity applies to the eponymous hero of the rebellion. It is the purpose here to focus on what made him rebel, and, more particularly, how important the poll tax was as a motivation of his rebellion. It will be shown that for a while opposition to the poll tax was indeed his paramount consideration, but that was some time before he rebelled, and, when he actually did, to be reinstated as chief and to take revenge against his successor were his most important motives.
Yet
he also launched the rebellion in the name of Dinuzulu, the putative king of
the Zulu nation. Dinuzulu’s involvement remains obscure. Bambatha was killed in
the rebellion (or in any event vanished from the scene of it) before Dinuzulu’s
involvement was discovered by the colonial authorities, and the evidence of the
rebels in the subsequent trials, culminating in that of Dinuzulu himself, is of
such a self-serving character that one cannot say whether it was really
Dinuzulu’s rebellion or Bambatha’s. Dinuzulu’s contribution will be considered
here in passing. The poll tax, legislated and proclaimed in 1905 and imposed
and collected in 1906, was a measure intended to give financial relief to the
Colony caught in economic depression.
Although it applied to all free adult males, its impact would be felt most widely
among the indigenous 81,5 % of the population. Hitherto their main liability to
the government was the hut tax of 14s paid by heads of households. The poll tax
of £1 applied to those men who did not pay the hut tax, and family heads now
feared that bachelors would no longer contribute towards the household payment
because they would have to pay for themselves. The hierarchical bonds of family
would be loosened.
In
practically all the divisions of the Colony there were protests against the
imposition of
the
poll tax. Rumours spread that under the aegis of Dinuzulu there would be a
forceful
resistance
to its collection and a number of chiefs in Natal and Zululand sent to him for
advice. He counselled payment and set an example by having his own people pay in
advance of the scheduled date. So
threatening were demonstrations against the tax in the Maphumulo Division that
the government dispatched a special police field force there in early February,
but bloodshed occurred first in the Richmond Division, when a police patrol
clashed with armed
protesters on 7 February. Next day the government proclaimed martial law and mobilized
the militia, and a much larger field force, assisted by a local levy of men, scoured
the area and arrested the protesters. They were court-martialled in mid-March and
twelve of them were sentenced to death and executed by firing squad at Richmond on
2 April. Field forces of militia made demonstrations in force in the south and
in
Maphumulo
during late February and March, restored order, and then demobilised. With such
impressive examples of government firmness, why then did Bambatha rebel in
early April? No major problems were expected with the collection of the poll
tax in the Umvoti Division. The resident magistrate, J. W. Cross, began at
Seven Oaks on 22 January and continued at Rietvlei and Muden, but had to go on
sick leave. Bambatha’s Zondi people had been originally scheduled to pay on the
5th, but Cross rescheduled them to pay last, in Greytown, the seat of the
division, on the 22nd. His replacement, Major Maxwell,dealt with a protest at
Hermannsburg by gaoling the chiefs and threatening to fine them,which brought
compliance. Cross resumed duty and collected at Matim atolo from 19 to 21
February. By the 22nd about £1 100 had been collected. A message was sent round Bambatha’s ‘location’, really the private farms of colonists in the Loza valley, that the men were to assemble at the homestead of Hanise, an important headman, about ten kilometres north of Greytown and just off the main road to Dundee. There Bambatha would sort out and send on those who had to pay. A large number of men turned out on the 22nd and proceeded up the road to Greytown, but a contingent from the Impanza valley under one Nhlonhlo arrived armed and without trousers, which were required to enter a town. The Impanza contingent refused to pay the tax. Bambatha remonstrated with them, and most of them went home. But not all. A portion under Mgombana made their way up the road. Some sang the traditional Zondi war chant, a few danced in warlike fashion, and Mgombana said things about fighting and attacking the townspeople. Bambatha and a few other leaders hastened to divert the Impanza men into a timber plantation about three kilometres outside town and persuaded them also to go home.
Bambatha
did not go into town himself, as he had intended, but told Saka, the nominal Headman
of the Impanza section, to explain to the magistrate that he could not come
because
he had a headache. Cross noticed that most of the Zondi men who arrived were
sullen and a lot of fathers were paying
for their sons. Saka gave Bambatha’s excuse, and when asked where the young men
were, he answered they were off courting. Only about 90 men paid the tax. That
evening a report of the armed assemblage in the trees reached town and the townspeople
were hastily laagered in the town hall for protection that night. The
government now moved to depose Bambatha. They did not know what had really happened
on the road to Greytown, and at first it appeared that Bambatha had got cold
feet only for fear of a leak upsetting the planned attack. But the government
was not deposing Bambatha just because of this. They were fed up with his bad
behaviour before this time, regarded him as a bad chief and, given the last
incident and the prevailing circumstances, he could no longer be tolerated. Indeed,
the record does not look good. He had become chief in 1890, and almost
immediately
he contrived to get his uncle and former regent Magwababa’s Anglo-Zulu war
service allowance cancelled. In 1895 he was suspended as chief for four months in
a cattle-stealing case, but got off when some of the witnesses perjured
themselves. The same year he started a boundary dispute with the neighbouring
amaBomvu in the Krantzkop Division. His claims were rejected by the
authorities, but he was unwilling to let go and the dispute poisoned relations
between the two groups for years to come.Between 1893 and 1906 he was defendant
in seven criminal cases and 37 civil cases, all for debt, and the judgments
were all against him.
During
the Second Anglo-Boer War he alleged that local Dutch farmers were victimising
some of his people because of their loyalty to the Crown. In August of 1905 he
led a gang to disrupt a wedding and in the ensuing fight between factions he
helped beat a man almost to death. By this time two or three factions were
identifiable among the amaZondi in the valley, and Bambatha was associated with
the Impanza section. His particularly savage behaviour
in
the faction fight was fully revealed at the trial at Greytown in mid-January.
On the 24th he was sentenced to a fine of £20 or three months’ imprisonment
with hard labour, and 42 of his followers were fined £5 with the option of a
month’s hard labour. All but five paid the fines. The faction fight determined
the government on his removal. The subsequent tax collection imbroglio simply
confirmed them in their determination. The Supreme Chief and the Minister for
Native Affairs concurred in Cross’s proposal that Magwababa be appointed chief,
and Magwababa and Bambatha were summoned to the capital to be told personally
of the decision, and Bambatha was to be warned that any further misconduct
would result in his being physically removed from the division. Between 23 February and 3 March three
messages were sent summoning Bambatha. The first time he said he would come but
did not. The second time he was reported as having said: ‘I am afraid I shall
be arrested if I go and rather than proceed to Pietermaritzburg I prefer to die
here.’ The third time the messengers could not find him. The amaZondi were in
turmoil. The Impanza section, or at least a very visible portion of them, were up in arms. The matter of the
summons was discussed at two large meetings at different homesteads. One
faction, associated with Magwababa, wanted him to go. The other faction,
associated with the Impanza section, professed to fear for his life,
sought
to protect him, and urged him not to go. ‘It will be better for Bambatha to die
in
our
hands, but he is not going to be driven and shot like a beast,’ exclaimed
Nhlonhlo. The Impanza section prevailed and Bambatha remained in their custody.
The government ordered his arrest and sent a strong police force down to get
him. En route they took Hanise into custody, but on arrival at the Impanza the
country seemed practically empty of people. Neither Bambatha nor Saka nor
Nhlonhlo were found. Bambatha did not wait for the government’s next move: he
fled to Zululand. The government put out a warrant, and on 23 March formally
deposed him. Magwababa was appointed chief for a year, acting as regent for
Bambatha’s younger brother Funizwe. The deputation to Pietermaritzburg assured
the Minister that the loyal element preponderated in the tribe and they would
restore order. In a strange volte-face Nhlonhlo tried to attach himself to the
deputation, but was arrested and imprisoned. So was Saka. Bambatha, a fugitive,
was not yet a rebel, but he was about to be galvanised into action. Whose idea
it originally was that he should go to Dinuzulu we may never know. And why
should he take with him, besides two men attendants, a pregnant wife (his favourite
one) and three of his children (but not by her)? It was an arduous trip to
Usuthu
which
took the men seven and the dependants nine days. The wife later insisted that Bambatha
was summoned, and Dinuzulu denied it. They do agree on Bambatha’s going to
Usuthu to ask Dinuzulu to give him a place to live, an escape from his many
problems in Natal. But the stories diverge thereafter. On the one hand,
Bambatha’s family state that Dinuzulu gave Bambatha a rifle and told him to go
back to Natal and start a rebellion.On the other, Dinuzulu and his adherents
state that he sent Bambatha packing, but almost fortuitously Bambatha mentioned
that there was a doctor among his people who could cure the sick and suffering
Dinuzulu, and so two men were sent with him to bring back the doctor.
Meanwhile
the family remained under wraps at Usuthu. Bambatha, his two attendants, and
Dinuzulu’s two men returned to Natal, and according to the latter Bambatha
produced not one gun but three on the way and began to talk recklessly of the
coming war. Bambatha left Natal on 12 March and returned on the 31st. He went
first to those faithful men of the Impanza section and announced that he was
going to lead the rebellion against the whites and Dinuzulu would come to
support him. He displayed the rifle and pointed to the two emissaries, who
confirmed what he said. One of them left a day or two later with a doctor, but
not the one promised, and Dinuzulu rejected him outright. Bambatha’s object now
was to rebel, and he sent to the neighbouring chiefs to tell them to join the
rebellion or suffer retribution from Dinuzulu, whose army was on the way. As he
gathered a force, he said hardly anything about the poll tax. If anything, Bambatha
was obsessed with revenge. He was enraged when he learnt that Magwababa had
replaced him and over and over he vowed to kill him. (He would have done so,
had not Dinuzulu’s man intervened.) Yet the other chiefs did not rally and
Dinuzulu never came. Allegedly the emissary who brought the doctor to Dinuzulu,
and then Dinuzulu himself, on being told of his rebellious acts, called
Bambatha a madman. With probably just over 700 men in his tribe, Bambatha
mustered no more than about 300. Many of these were commandeered, and when he
left for Zululand at least half of them deserted. Only the Impanza section
remained faithful. In conclusion let us return to the matter of motivation.
What drove Bambatha to rebel? It was the prospect of deposition, not the poll
tax. He apparently counselled the bellicose Impanza section against resisting
the tax, but fell in with them when he found that he was going to be deposed.
His great concern was to maintain his position and destroy his enemies. A man
of his profligate and violent lifestyle would not fare long as a commoner. He
fled to Usuthu in fear and returned in anger, emboldened to rebel. Perhaps someone
there with another agenda was using him. Or perhaps he was a desperate man with
a vivid imagination who lied himself into an impossible situation. Even with Dinuzulu’s
help, he would not have recovered his position, and as a rebel leader he was doomed
from the outset. In Zululand he lost effective control over the rebellion
Units Zululand Mounted Rifles Zululand Field Force
Staff Umvoti
Division Reserves Umsinga
Division Reserves Transvaal
Volunteer Transport CorpsTransvaal Volunteer Staff Transvaal Mounted Rifles Transvaal Medical Staff Corps
Sibindies Levies Searchlight Section Royston's Horse Northern Disttrict Mounted Rifles
Nkandhla Town Guard Newcastle Division Reserves
New Hanover Reserves Natal Veterinary Corps Natal Telegraph Corps Natal Service CorpsNatal Royal Regiment Natal Rangers
Researched and Compiled by: Louis scheepers boertjie@lantic.net
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